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Barry Gough. Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the Admiralty. 
Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2017. Pp. 600.
Barry Gough’s new book Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the 
Admiralty is an important contribution to the already voluminous 
literature on both of these figures. Examining Winston Churchill 
and Admiral John Fisher’s relationship and the naval developments 
of the first two decades of the twentieth century helps give new 
perspective on each man’s personality and the positions they took 
on important issues. The book is a well-written narrative history of 
the era, aimed at both scholars and members of the public who are 
interested in naval history, Fisher or Churchill. However, the book 
could have dealt more with the role that the culture of the Royal 
Navy (RN) had on each man’s career. Similarly, the imperial context 
of both men’s lives is more hinted at than examined in a systematic 
manner. Nonetheless, Gough’s book will provide new insights into 
the period for even the most knowledgeable scholar of the era.
Churchill and Fisher builds on the extensive naval historiography 
of the period and some of the immense body of literature on Churchill. 
In particular Gough cites the approach of Arthur Marder in his five 
volume From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow as a major inspiration. As 
such, he argues that a narrative approach to history, which emphasises 
the role of personality and contingency, best captures the naval 
developments of the early twentieth century (pp. xiii-xix). Following 
this approach allows Gough to place his extensive primary research 
at the heart of his argument. Gough’s use of the personal papers of 
the Second Viscount Esher, who was a close friend of Fisher and 
at the centre of British political society, is particularly illuminating. 
Scholars of the period will almost certainly find documents or 
quotations that they have not seen before and so will likely follow the 
extensive endnotes very closely.
Churchill and Fisher begins with three chapters covering Fisher’s 
early career, and his time at the Admiralty. Gough adds nuance to 
the historical genesis of a number of Fisher’s reforms, showing, for 
instance, that Lord Selborne was a key player in the development 
of personnel reforms. Gough argues that “Fisher was essentially a 
democrat” and thus improving the conditions for the lower decks 
was an important concern for him (p. 82). He goes on to argue that 
the overall officer culture of the RN was the key reason that Fisher’s 
personnel reforms met such resistance. Gough suggests that the main 
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thrust of these reforms was to professionalise the RN’s officer corps 
and make it more open to those of a variety of social backgrounds.
The well-known feud between Fisher and Admiral Charles 
Beresford is set into the context of the wider opposition within the 
navy to Fisher’s reforms. Gough also argues that Fisher’s methods 
of leadership were also partly to blame for the resistance (p. 104). 
Gough shows the complexity of the dispute and effectively makes 
the case that it was far more than a personal feud. The ongoing 
disagreement eventually split the navy and became a subject of 
political controversy, resulting in Fisher’s early retirement. The 
book’s description of the dispute skillfully balances the importance 
of Fisher’s reforms to the RN as it was modernised along with his 
more unscrupulous and controversial actions. The hints that Gough 
provides about the nature of the culture of the RN around the turn 
of the century are tantalising and this reviewer wishes that they had 
been more fully developed.
The development of Dreadnought and Invincible are discussed, 
though Gough contends that Fisher saw submarines as more 
revolutionary in their impact on naval warfare. This fact was only 
grasped by a few contemporaries, including Churchill. Churchill enters 
Gough’s story towards the end of his discussion of Fisher’s tenure as 
First Sea Lord, often in connection with Churchill’s opposition to 
large Naval Estimates. He effectively illustrates how Churchill and 
Fisher’s relationship grew from one where Fisher was highly skeptical 
of Churchill’s intentions towards the navy into one where Churchill 
became Fisher’s pupil in naval affairs.
Gough’s treatment of Churchill is also even-handed. He gives 
Churchill credit for his effective handling of the buildup of the RN 
during his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill is in turn 
criticised for the limited naval staff system that proved insufficient 
for the demands that modern naval warfare placed on it. Churchill’s 
tendency to ignore well-reasoned opposition and out-argue his 
opponents is also explored and emerges as one of the key reasons for 
Churchill and Fisher’s split over the Dardanelles campaign.
Gough’s discussion of Churchill’s role in deploying the RN at 
the beginning of the First World War again demonstrates his careful 
documentary research. In spite of Churchill’s well-known claim 
that he was the one that ordered the British fleet to stay mobilised 
following summer exercises, Gough shows that it was actually First 
Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg who ordered that the fleet not 
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be demobilised and that Churchill merely approved the order when 
he returned to London after a weekend away (pp. 211-212). Though 
Gough is not always so careful in his research, such as when he 
somewhat inexplicably states that Room 40, the RN’s code-breaking 
operation, was “in a quiet wing of the Old Admiralty Building,” when 
in fact it was located in the same corridor as the Admiralty Board 
Room and the First Sea Lord’s office.1
The early months of the First World War demonstrated Churchill’s 
interest in offensive military operations such as his leadership of the 
defence of Antwerp, which Gough says “did him little credit” (p. 257). 
Fisher was recalled to the admiralty in November 1914 and initially 
worked well with Churchill as both men shared a strong desire to use 
the navy in offensive operations. However, in spite of early promise, 
Churchill and Fisher were ill-suited to working together as both men 
wanted supreme control of naval operations in their own hands. Fisher 
complained repeatedly to friends about Churchill circumventing his 
authority by privately writing to fleet commanders.
The Dardanelles operation looms large in any historical discussion 
of Churchill and Fisher and Gough helps to untangle who originated 
the idea of the operation and each man’s role in either pushing 
it forward or opposing it.2 Gough carefully pieces together how 
Churchill and Fisher’s working relationship broke down during the 
planning of the Dardanelles. In late 1914 both Churchill and Fisher 
were initially intrigued by the possibility of forcing the Dardanelles 
by naval means alone. However, as Churchill and the Cabinet became 
increasingly fixed on forcing the Dardanelles by naval means alone, 
Fisher’s concerns about the operation grew, though he only expressed 
his reservations privately. As the naval attack on the Dardanelles 
commenced, Churchill had essentially assumed operational command 
1  Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 15.
2  The historiography on the Dardanelles and Gallipoli is massive; some recent 
highlights include Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and the Dardanelles (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), which provides a balanced account of Churchill’s role 
in the Dardanelles Campaign. For a more critical and less balanced assessment of 
Churchill’s role in the Dardanelles campaign, see Tom Curran, The Grand Deception: 
Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (Newport, Australia: Big Sky Publishing, 
2015). For a recent examination of British planning of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli 
campaign more broadly, see Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
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of the navy, displacing both Fisher and the Chief of the Naval Staff 
in the process.
Fisher was concerned by what he saw as the weakening of naval 
forces in the decisive theatre of the North Sea and the other Sea 
Lords shared his concern. As the landings at Gallipoli were checked, 
Fisher stepped up his opposition to the operation. At the War Council 
meeting of 14 May 1915, Fisher stated directly to the leaders of 
the British government his objections to the Dardanelles operation 
and said he had been against it from the beginning. Churchill then 
defended the operation in the Dardanelles, “but it was readily clear to 
all present that a deep...fissure existed between Fisher and Churchill 
over the operation” (p. 376). Fisher walked out of the Admiralty the 
next day, writing resignation letters to Churchill and Prime Minister 
Herbert Asquith. Gough does an excellent job carefully tracing 
Fisher’s actions during these critical days when he refused to return 
to the Admiralty in spite of a direct order from the Prime Minister 
to do so. Gough rightfully condemns the manner of Fisher’s exit from 
the Admiralty as irresponsible. Fisher’s resignation also set in motion 
the events that would lead to Churchill’s removal as First Lord and 
a new coalition government.
Gough’s book makes important modifications to the story of 
Churchill and especially Fisher. His even-handed treatment of both 
men shows both at their best and worst, and Gough praises and 
criticises in equal measure in this balanced portrayal of each man. 
One or two factual errors aside, the only weaknesses in the book are 
a lack of a more thorough discussion of the RN’s culture during the 
early twentieth century and the links between that culture and the 
wider world of the British Empire, though the latter is covered in 
some detail by Gough’s own Pax Britannica (2014). However, these 
concerns do not substantially diminish the value of this book as a 
work of immense scholarship.
james walton, queen’s university
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